Patriot Analysis – 11/16/03
No Option but War
By Kirt R. Poovey
Last week this column detailed the last minute maneuvering that the Iraqi government made to try to avoid war with the US. Now we will look at proof that the Bush administration did not want to resolve the situation with anything but regime change as this column pointed out March 9th before the war began.
On September 12, 2002, President Bush spoke at the United Nations and put forth an ultimatum for Saddam Hussein. He warned that “action will be unavoidable” unless Iraq complied with a host of past UN resolutions on weapons inspections, human rights, the repatriation of prisoners of war, and the state sponsorship of terrorism.
On September 17th, Hussein agreed to the unconditional return of weapons inspectors to Iraq. Arab leaders had pressured Iraq heavily to concede to inspections. However, in typical Hussein fashion he tried to put restrictions on what inspectors would be allowed. On November 8, 2002, the UN Security Council unanimously passed an ultimatum to Iraq to accept the return of weapons inspectors unconditionally.
Finally, on November 14, 2002, Saddam bowed to international pressure and agreed to allow the inspectors to return to Iraq. At the same time Iraqi foreign minister, Naji Sabri, vehemently denied that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction “whether nuclear, chemical, or biological”. On November 27th weapons inspectors reported that Iraq provided full cooperation.
On December 7th, Iraq delivered a required 12,159 page declaration on Iraq’s arms capability. Saddam Hussein again claimed that his regime “retains no weapons of mass destruction”. Hussein also issued a surprise apology to Kuwait for his 1990 invasion. Both the US and Britain claimed that they had “solid evidence” that Iraq still had banned weapons systems.
By December 20th the Bush and Blair administrations accused Iraq of being in “material breach” of its UN obligations to fully disclose its weapons arsenal. Colin Powell stated that Saddam had missed his final chance to avert war.
On December 22nd, Iraq accused the Bush administration of lying. "We have told the world we are not producing these kind of weapons, but it seems that the world is drugged, absent, or in a weak position," said President Saddam Hussein. General Amir al-Sadi, the scientific adviser to Hussein, restating the Iraqi position that they had no WMDs, challenged the US and Britain, "We do not even have any objections if the CIA sent somebody with the inspectors to show them the suspected sites.” Privately, officials in the British government admitted they had no “killer evidence” about WMDs, or they would have already given it to the inspectors.
On February 14, 2003, British and US intelligence suffered embarrassment. In a report to the UN, both chief UN weapons inspectors called into question Colin Powell’s evidence he presented a few days earlier at the UN. Hans Blix challenged satellite photos of a munitions depot that Powell claimed showed decontamination vehicles associated with chemical weapons. Blix said: "The reported movement of munitions at the site could just as easily have been a routine activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent inspection." Blix said that the discovery of 2,000 pages of documents at an Iraqi scientist’s home contained nothing new and were over 12 years old. An angry Powell claimed that “the threat of force must remain”.
February 24th saw Russia join with France and Germany in offering an alternative to war with Iraq. China gave its endorsement also. The plan called for all of Iraq being a no-fly zone with UN peacekeepers controlling the country for several years. Germany would be part of the UN force. All WMDs would be destroyed and Saddam might be able to retain his presidency. It was a step-by-step program for the disarmament of Saddam’s regime. The draft resolution stated, "While suspicions remain, no evidence has been given that Iraq still possesses weapons of mass destruction or capabilities in this field.”
Britain and the US were livid at this attempt to thwart their war effort. Meanwhile, Iraq, as documented last week by this column, worked feverishly behind the scenes to avert a war.
On March 7th, Britain issued an ultimatum – Iraq would be invaded "unless, on or before 17 March 2003, the council concludes that Iraq has demonstrated full, unconditional, immediate and active cooperation in accordance with its disarmament obligations". France threatened to veto any such resolution, but it was obvious that the US and Britain were setting a date.
Britain put forth six “benchmark” tests for full cooperation: “1) a public statement by Saddam Hussein, broadcast in Iraq, admitting possession of weapons of mass destruction, stating his regime has decided to give them up and pledging to cooperate with UN weapon inspectors; 2) a commitment to allow Iraqi scientists to be interviewed by the inspectors outside Iraq; 3) the surrender of, and explanation of the 10,000 liters of anthrax the Iraqis are believed still to be holding; 4) a commitment to the destruction of proscribed missiles; 5) an account of the unmanned aerial vehicles and remotely piloted vehicles or drones; and 6) commitment to surrender all mobile bio-production laboratories for destruction.”
Saddam’s Iraq was left with no viable options. They had tried behind the scenes contacts, but they all failed because the goal from the beginning was Saddam’s removal and nothing else.
Next week – the final proof that the Bush administration wanted war and not peace.
"We will stand, fight, and die to defend our country; but we will not blindly trust it. Even our Founding Fathers distrusted a large, centralized, all-powerful federal government -- so should we. Always be on guard to discern the truth and defend it at all costs."